by Scott Plencner
term paper written 11/2001 for David Leahman's Globalization in the Third World
Twelve years of civil war. Twelve years of death squads, insurgency, injustice, sleepless nights, and struggle. Twelve years that felt to many like they would never end, did, in fact, end as the Salvadoran government and the insurgent FMLA tentatively stood behind the promises they made in the 1992 Peace Accords, a series of talks that went on and on amid the bloodshed for a time. A changing world scene forced them to the talks and would shape the policies of the nation as it struggled to redefine itself to the creditors and economic interests to the North who might help the country rebuild after the war. This essentially brought the fate of the dependent, war-torn country into the meeting rooms of the U.N. and the U.S. State Department.
The end of the Cold War, essentially coming about after the failed coup of Soviet hard-liners in August of 1991, altered the face of the world in quick and startling ways. Some Eastern European nations turned to forms of American democracy. A few years later, communist China would open its doors a crack to capitalism. The effects of the fall of the Soviet Union was felt in the Western Hemisphere too. After 1991, the United States was left with the daunting task of re-focusing and reshaping its foreign policy, previously dependent on worldwide opposition to communism. It was this policy and the millions of dollars that once accompanied it that fueled the war in El Salvador. (1)
After focusing on Europe and Asia following two world wars, the United States under the Reagan administration turned its attention once again to its Latin American neighbors to the South. Reagan's stance against communism and the Soviet Union made the Central American scene, as the American U.N. Ambassador Jean Kirkpatrick one said, "the most important place in the world." (2) This all changed as the Cold War eased to a conclusion at the end of the 1980's. Central America without the Cold War was not so important to the U.S. during the Bush administration, which turned its attention to Eastern Europe and the Middle East.
Some intellectuals in Latin America like Jorge Castaneda of Mexico's National Autonomous University feared in 1990 that Washington may replace the "evil empire to the East with the evil [drug-producing, immigrant generating] slum to the South." (3)
This uncertainty of the early '90's is also reflected in Daniel Santiago's fear of the re-emergence of "The Black Legend" among Americans and Europeans who might aid in rebuilding the country. Santiago, a Salvadoran priest associated with the FMLN, argues that the four hundred year-old legend of Spanish barbarism (replacing Aztec barbarism in Latin America) is still alive and could be reborn in post-Cold War El Salvador. He says, "Salvadoran death squads and torture... make sense in such a context." He adds, "Somehow these facts justify [for the U.S.] elaborate state security apparatus and armies in Latin American countries." The priest argues to his American readers that violence in El Salvador is not the result of Spanish culture, but merely "a means to an end" for the few "powerful cliques" that hold the wealth of the nations. Santiago argues that the fight needs to continue, although he writes in the midst of the peace talks. He accuses the U.S. of subjugating El Salvador as he watched his own FMLA and ARENA unite in an effort led by the U.N. and the U.S. to cement peace in the region. (4)
With suspicion in El Salvador growing, President Clinton attempted to redefine the role of the U.S. in Central America when he came to office in 1993. His view of national security was intertwined with the health of the U.S. domestic economy, a view that would again place major emphasis on Latin America. He linked all of this with the promotion of democracy and a neo-liberal economic outlook in the region. (5)
In the same month Clinton took his oath of office peace in El Salvador was already threatened as the FMLN, in order to turn in the arms that had been unaccounted for by ONUSAL (U.N.) inspectors (6), made further demands on the Salvadoran government to reform the armed forces of the nation. The Ad Hoc Commission, set up by the accords, announced the removal of one hundred officers allegedly responsible for human rights violations during the struggle. President Cristiani, though, retained several key officers of this group. (7) The FMLN was split over the decision by Cristiani, but the United States was not happy with the decision.
In March, Clinton threatened to hold back $11 million in U.S. economic aid to El Salvador unless Cristiani respected the ruling of the Ad Hoc Commission. The Cold War precedents behind the Reagan administration's position in El Salvador caused the president to never threaten a cut off in aid to El Salvador, despite noted dissatisfaction with the human rights record. Without the Cold War to fight, Clinton was free to focus on the instability caused by violence and to "wield a bit of stick along with the carrots of economic and military aid," as William LeoGrande commented in 1995. (8) The country of El Salvador had become dependent on U.S. aid and remittances throughout the '80's as the war-time economy slumped, (9) and the Salvadoran government was forced to concede to the desires of the power to the North. All of the accused officers left their posts by the end of the year.
By the end of 1993, despite the concerns of people like Father Santiago and the increasing tension between parties, President Clinton had 450 U.S. troops deployed in El Salvador, conducting a "humanitarian" training mission called by the administration "Strong Roads 1993- South." U.S. military officials were training the Salvadoran armed forces in "civic action," comprising mainly of infrastructure building, a violation of the 1992 Peace Accords which clearly prohibits the Salvadoran military from political programs. The Salvadoran army participated despite the domestic friction it caused in the hopes it could repair its image to the North, an image damaged by massacres during the '80' and the October, 1993, execution-style murder of FMLN congressional candidate Francisco Velis. (10)
The U.S. again showed up to push El Salvador in the direction it wanted it to go when the 1994 election registration was stalled by Cristiani's ARENA officials. Upon receipt of the bad news, the U.S. House of Representatives recommended to Clinton the cancellation of $70 million in aid to El Salvador. The Salvadoran government accelerated the campaign and over 300,000 unregistered voters were put into the mix for the March election. (11) The election went on as the U.S. and the peace accords had prescribed, with the FMLN running a strong second to ARENA candidates. Leo Grande boasts in a 1995 article that "El Salvador is making a surprisingly successful transition to democracy, with an occasional boost by Washington to get it past the rough spots." (12)
El Salvador's subjugation, as Father Santiago put it, is due largely to its dependence on economic aid from foreign nations and banks. El Salvador sent representatives of ARENA and the FMLN to the World Bank meeting in 1992, where it successfully petitioned for $800 million in postwar reconstruction aid. "Through efforts such as these," a U.S. State Department official remarked in 1992, "Salvadorans deserve full credit for achieving peace and starting the work of national reconciliation." (13) Most aid came from the United States, though, causing the Salvadoran government to become subservient to the will of the administration in Washington. While Reagan pushed for the destruction of communist opposition at almost any cost and land reform (14), Clinton pushed for the exportation of American-style democracy, liberal trade policies, and the economic stability peace could bring. The Salvadoran government responded in both cases.
The U.S. was the main player, although not the only one. "The Four Friends" of Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and Spain, which aided in the peace talks also maintained an interest in the nation. Spain, more so than other nations, pushed the full implementation of the all-civilian police force prescribed by the 1992 accords. (15) Mexico included the nation in its 1996 free trade zone, essentially integrating the Salvadoran economy with that of others in the region. (16)
President Cristiani, after the war, opened his nation to liberal trade, lowering tariffs, privatizing state firms, and inviting foreign investment to a region that has become a major buyer of U.S. exports. Clinton also proposed reducing the debt of the Salvadoran government to the U.S. in the hopes the nation could use the saved money to invest in social projects that might make foreign investment even more of an option. (17)
With one-fifth of the nation's people living in Canada and the U.S. (18), remittances and immigration issues were also becoming important factors in El Salvador's economy, now relying on the money being sent back home as much as the money coming in officially as foreign aid. The money brought in this way were a major reason why the nation's economy focused not on coffee production and the land needed to do this as it had before, but rather on the more urban commercial and service sector. Due to this shift, the Salvadoran government worked tentatively with the U.S. and Mexico in improving the situation for Salvadorans in exile, one million of whom reside in the U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, in 1996, though, pledged before the Salvadoran Assembly to "faithfully enforce [U.S.] immigration laws" and urged El Salvador to follow Honduras's lead in punishing those who "smuggle migrants across U.S. borders." These smugglers, he said, "are the slave traders of this era." (19) The Bush administration's lean toward opening up U.S. immigration laws with the insistence of Mexican President Vicente Fox, may clear the way for the Salvadoran government to request the same sort of exceptions.
As the decade drew to a close, the governments of El Salvador and the United States grew ever-closer. In 1999, the U.S. and El Salvador signed a Bilateral Investment Treaty, another step toward neo-liberal free-trade in the country. (20) The government of El Salvador in 2000 allowed the U.S. to use space in the nation as a "monitoring center" where it could base operations against the illegal drug trade in Latin America. Although the FMLN strongly rejected the treaty, the treaty passed by a simple majority and was implemented. The FMLN complained to the Salvadoran Supreme Court, though, protesting the passage of the treaty since the Constitution requires a three-fourths vote "for agreements affecting national sovereignty." (21) The U.S. and ARENA claim the motion was not a treaty.
After rejections by Panama and Costa Rica, the U.S. offered El Salvador an additional $2.2 million in aid to back its plan which allows U.S. soldiers to carry weapons on Salvadoran soil. The Salvadoran police have grown close to the U.S. Defense Department in the process of passing the treaty, and defend the measures as ones that protect against local crime. U.S. embassy official Greg Phillips justified the treaty as one that "defends Salvadoran sovereignty." (22)
The FMLN continues to oppose the government led by ARENA. When U.S. and Salvadoran soldiers descended in 2000 on the FMLN stronghold of Arcatao offering health services, the city's citizens turned them away with bullhorns. The FMLN accused the U.S. of re-enforcing its position in the nation and aiding in re-militarizing the police and contributed the moves to their advances in the 1999 elections. ARENA officials accuse some members of the FMLN of being tied to Colombian drug lords. (23)
This political situation is a reflection of many in the tense political climate of El Salvador that exists today. The United States has continued to show strong influence in the everyday politics of the region, long after the "Four Friends" and the U.N. have receded from the picture a bit. Luckily for now, Salvadoran disagreements have been brought to the debates within the Legislative Assembly and have not spilled over into the streets in a hail of bullets and bloodshed as had happened in the late 1970's and 1980's.
ENDNOTES
1-Leogrande, p. 24 2-ibid., p. 22 3-Wilson Quarterly, p. 11 4-Santiago, p. 18 5-LeoGrande, p. 24 6-Aronson, p. 578 7-LeoGrande, p. 27 8-ibid. 9-Wood, pp. 60-1 10-Zielinski, p. 15 11-LeoGrande, p.28 12-ibid. 13-Aronson, p. 579 14-per Aronson, $3 out of every $4 sent to El Salvador in the 1980's was meant for land reform, redistributing 15% of the arable land to 575,000 peasants 15-ibid., 581 16-Wood, p. 64 17-Aronson, p. 579 18-Karnes, p. 181 19-Christopher, p. 81 20-International Law Update, p. 47 21-Brackley, p. 20 22-ibid 23-ibid
updated January 20, 2002
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